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of	climate	finance,	adaptation,	 technology	 transfer,	 reporting,	
























on	 any	 legally	 binding	 obligations	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 similar	
developing	country	commitments.	Although	developing	coun-



























binding	 targets	or	 timetables	 for	 reduction	of	greenhouse	gas	
emissions.	The	Kyoto	Protocol,	negotiated	in	1997,	on	the	other	
implicationS of the copenhagen accoRD foR 
global climate goveRnance
by David Hunter*
* David Hunter is assistant professor and director of the Program on Interna-
tional and Comparative Environmental Law at the American University Wash-
ington College of Law.  He is also the director of AU’s Washington Summer 
Session on Environmental Law.













the bali woRk plan
Recognizing	 that	 the	 first	
reporting	period	under	the	Kyoto	
Protocol	would	end	in	2012,	the	
global	 community	 worked	 for	
several	years	to	set	forth	a	nego-
tiating	plan	that	would	build	on	
the	 Kyoto	 Protocol,	 bring	 the	
United	States	back	into	the	UN	
process	 for	 addressing	 climate	
change,	 and	 outline	 the	 future	
obligations,	 if	 any,	 of	 devel-
oping	 countries.	 These	 efforts	
culminated	 in	 2007	 when	 the	
parties	 to	 the	Framework	Con-
vention	agreed	 to	 the	 so-called	
Bali	Road	Map—a	roadmap	 to	





commitments	 of	 those	 parties	
that	have	adopted	an	emissions	
cap	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	
(called	“Annex	I	Parties”),8	(2)	















ics	 for	 “consideration”	during	 the	negotiations,	 including:	 (i)	
“measurable,	reportable	and	verifiable”	commitments,	including	
quantified	emissions	limitations,	by	all	developed	countries;	and	











provisions	 in	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan	 committed	 the	 parties	 to	
negotiate	positive	incentives	for	
reducing	emissions	from	defor-
estation	 and	 forest	 degradation	
(“REDD”)	in	developing	coun-
tries,14	 enhanced	 actions	 for	
adaptation,15	 technology	devel-
opment	and	transfer,16	and	inter-
national	 financial	 support	 for	
responding	to	climate	change.17
The	Bali	Action	Plan	com-
mitted	 both	 the	 United	 States	
and	 developing	 countries	 to	
negotiating	a	post-Kyoto	agree-
ment	 with	 some	 form	 of	 bind-
ing—or	 at	 least	 measurable,	
reportable,	 and	 verifiable—
commitments.	Under	 the	 terms	
of	 the	 Bali	 Action	 Plan,	 the	
agreement	 was	 to	 be	 negoti-
ated	by	the	Fifteenth	CoP	of	the	
UNFCCC	in	December,	2009	in	
Copenhagen.	 The	 Bali	 Action	












its	domestic	 legislative	agenda	with	 the	hopes	 that	economy-
wide	emission	targets	passed	by	the	U.S.	Congress	could	form	
the	basis	for	international	commitments	at	Copenhagen.18	Even	
before	 his	 inauguration,	 Obama	 signaled	 to	 the	 international	
community	his	intention	to	engage	in	meaningful	climate	nego-
tiations	by	publicly	endorsing	federal	cap-and-trade	legislation	
with	 targets	 for	 reducing	current	emissions	 to	1990	 levels	by	
Rather than a detailed, 
binding framework 
for furthering global 
climate cooperation, the 
parties left Copenhagen 
with a general political 
statement that privileges 
the voluntary actions 
of states and devalues 
the role of international 




































































oping	 countries	 were	 unlikely	 to	 make	 any	 significant	 com-




















in	 showing	up	at	Copenhagen?	World	 leaders	 typically	show	
up	 for	 photo	 opportunities	 at	 international	 summits,	 not	 for	
negotiations.
As	 Copenhagen	 approached,	 countries	 began	 to	 position	
themselves	 more	 clearly	 for	 the	 upcoming	 negotiations—but	
the	public	signals	 remained	 largely	mixed.	The	United	States	
announced	they	would	accept	targets	of	17%	reductions	from	
2005	 levels	 by	 2050	 and	 80%	 reductions	 by	 2050.25	 This	























proposal,	 wanting	 to	 pursue	 the	 “two-track”	 approach:	 addi-
tional	binding	commitments	for	developed	countries	under	the	
Kyoto	Protocol	and	nonbinding	actions	 for	developing	coun-


















hard	 line	 and	 offering	 little	 compromise.	 President	 Obama’s	






















ShaReD viSion foR long-teRm coopeRative action
As	part	of	the	Bali	Action	Plan,	the	parties,	including	the	
United	 States	 and	 most	 other	 major	 countries	 in	 the	 world,	
agreed	 to	 launch	 a	 “comprehensive	 process”	 for	 achieving	 a	





Unfortunately,	 the	 Accord	 provides	 little	 specificity	 sur-






















strengthening	 the	 long-term	 goal	 referencing	 various	 matters	




the geneRal fRamewoRk foR mitigation






wide	 emissions	 targets	 for	 2020.”33	 These	 commitments	 are	
expected	to	“further	strengthen	the	emissions	reductions	initi-
ated	by	the	Kyoto	Protocol.”34	Second,	non-Annex	I	countries	










Both	 Annex	 I	 and	 Non-Annex	 I	 countries	 that	 choose	









the	 United	 States,	 on	 passage	 of	
national	 legislation.	 Develop-






emissions	 to	 increase	 but	 less	
than	expected).	Others,	such	as	
India	 and	 China,	 committed	 to	
reducing	 their	 energy	 intensity	
(i.e.	 to	 improving	 their	 emis-
sions	per	unit	output)	but	plac-
ing	no	overall	cap	on	emissions.	
Still	 others,	 like	 the	 Congo	 or	
Brazil,	 listed	 numerous	 sector-
specific	 actions	 or	 goals	 they	
would	 meet.	 Some	 represen-
tative	 examples	 of	 country	
pledges	are	listed	below	on	page	
9-10.



























monitoRing, RepoRting anD veRification
Ever	since	 the	Bali	negotiations	finished	and	 the	world’s	
attention	shifted	to	Copenhagen,	requirements	for	monitoring,	
reporting,	and	verification	 (“MRV”)	 loomed	among	 the	most	
controversial	and	difficult	 issues.	It	was	clear	that	developing	
countries	would	 agree	 to	 a	wide	 range	of	voluntary	 commit-
ments,	 but	 they	 were	 resistant	
to	any	international	oversight—
i.e.	 any	 MRV	 requirements—
attaching	 to	 those	 voluntary	
commitments.	 On	 the	 other	
hand,	 developing	 countries	






Ensuring	 some	 MRV	 require-





international	 financial	 or	 tech-
nology	assistance.
In	 the	 end,	 developing	


















One	 area	 that	 enjoyed	 perhaps	 the	 greatest	 consensus	 in	
Copenhagen	 was	 the	 framework	 for	 reducing	 emission	 from	
deforestation	 and	 forest	 degradation	 (“REDD”).	 Developing	
countries	 saw	 this	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 generate	 significant	
amounts	of	 foreign	assistance	and	 investment	 to	 improve	 the	
The result was not a 
negotiation over targets 
or actions, but a series of 
unilateral press releases, 
with each country 
announcing what it is 
willing to do to mitigate 
climate change.















































































































of	 financial	 support	 from	 developed	 countries	 was	 critical.49	
Secretary	of	State	Hillary	Clinton	made	a	high-profile	announce-
ment	that	the	industrialized	countries	would	collectively	provide	
$10	billion	 in	annual	support	over	 the	near	 term	(2010-2012)	
and	financial	resources	up	to	$100	billion	per	year	by	2020.50	
These	numbers	would	be	enshrined	in	the	Copenhagen	Accord,	






































the	more	important	reason	for	U.S.	support	 is	 that	 the	United	

































support	 enhanced	 action	 on	 mitigation,	 including	 substantial	
finance	to	reduce	emissions	from	deforestation	and	forest	deg-
radation	(REDD-plus),	adaptation,	technology	development	and	














Indeed,	financing	 is	now	expected	 to	be	a	major	 focus	of	 the	
2010	negotiations	in	Cancun,	Mexico.
ImplIcaTIons For global clImaTe governance
























the thReat to a negotiateD, Science-baSeD 
appRoach






of	 targets	 and	 timetables	 that	 will	 achieve	 the	 science-based	
cap	on	emissions;	(3)	a	global	market-based	system	will	assist	
in	re-allocating	the	cap,	through	such	mechanisms	as	cap-and-
trade	 and	 the	 offset	 market;	 and	 (4)	 compliance	 with	 targets	
and	timetables	will	be	monitored	internationally	and	sanctions	
for	non-compliance	may	be	imposed	by	the	other	parties.	The	



























less	 important	 to	addressing	global	climate	change	 than	what	
happens	in	the	capitals	of	key	countries.	Indeed,	although	the	
Accord	provides	for	significantly	less	monitoring	and	oversight	






national	negotiations	 to	building	capacity	 for	national	 imple-


















the emeRgence of a pluRaliStic appRoach to 
climate goveRnance




was	 ultimately	 negotiated	 outside	 of	 the	 formal	 UNFCCC	





























arguably	 undermines	 progress	 toward	 reaching	 broad	 global	
consensus	for	long-term	cooperative	action.
The	 potential	 for	 splitting	 off	 a	 new	 negotiating	 pro-
cess	under	 the	Accord	raises	 the	specter	of	a	more	pluralistic	
approach	to	climate	governance,	with	significantly	more	insti-




willingness	 to	 negotiate	 the	Accord	outside	of	 the	UNFCCC	






















































policy	 and	 coordinate	 financing.63	 Complicating	 this	 further	








of	 national	 and	 regional	 climate-related	 funds.	 For	 obvious	




















enue.	 During	 the	 Copenhagen	




institutions	 and	 to	 ensure	 that	
the	goals	of	the	UNFCCC	were	
being	 efficiently	 advanced.	
This	 greater	 coordinating	 role	





Much	 of	 the	 debate,	 both	
before	 and	 after	 Copenhagen,	
centered	 around	 whether	 the	
parties	would	continue	the	pur-
suit	 of	 legally	 binding	 targets	
and	timetables.	In	the	end,	the	
choice	 to	 accept	 a	 non-bind-
ing	 option	 reflected	 a	 lack	 of	
political	 consensus—not	 over	







ule	for	negotiating	a	binding	agreement	 in	 the	near	future.	 In	
short,	Copenhagen	can	only	be	viewed	as	a	major	set-back	for	
anyone	seeking	a	hard,	binding	agreement.
To	 some	extent,	 however,	 the	 concerns	over	 the	 relative	
“hardness”	 of	 the	 climate	 regime	 may	 be	 too	 formalistic	 an	
inquiry.	We	should	not	 lose	sight	 that	 the	end	goal	of	global	
climate	policy	is	to	take	action	to	reduce	the	risk	of	significant	
climate	disruption	—	it	is	not	to	have	a	binding	agreement.	In	




monitored	 and	 enforced.	 As	 Jake	 Werksman	 of	 the	 World	
Resources	Institute	notes,	more	important	than	the	formality	is	
the	 functionality	of	binding	 international	 law.65	According	 to	






Looking	 first	 at	 the	 normative	 framework,	 the	 Accord	
offers	 some	 modest	 steps	 forward.	 The	 Accord’s	 “pledge-
and-review”	 system	 means	 that	
both	the	United	States	and	most	
developing	countries	for	the	first	
time	 have	 agreed	 to	 take	 some	
specific	 actions	 for	 mitigating	
climate	change.	As	can	be	 seen	
from	the	few	examples	excerpted	
above,	 many	 (although	 not	 all)	
of	the	commitments	made	under	
the	Accord	 could,	 in	 theory,	 be	
measured	and	verified.	Thus,	for	
example,	 economy-wide	 reduc-
tions,	 improvements	 in	 energy-
intensity,	 or	 sector-specific	
actions	 can	 all	 be	 monitored	
effectively,	 assuming	 the	 coun-
try	 has	 established	 appropriate	
baselines,	developed	methodolo-
gies	 for	 measuring	 results,	 and	
committed	the	resources	to	moni-
toring	 over	 time.	 Developing	
countries	also	agreed	for	the	first	






















[B]oth the process and 
outcome of Copenhagen 
do not offer significant 
reason to hope that the 
world’s leaders can put 
aside short-term political 
expedience to make 
the long-term, shared, 
equitable steps needed to 
avert substantial climate 
disruption.
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oversight—resulted	 in	 a	 two-tiered	 outcome.	 For	 developing	
countries	 that	 take	 steps	without	 international	 support,	MRV	













sidered	 the	 relative	 lack	of	MRV	requirements	 to	be	a	major	
victory	that	preserved	their	national	sovereignty.
Even	 more	 disappointing	 for	 those	 who	 want	 muscular	
international	 oversight	 is	 the	 lack	 of	 any	 sanctions	 for	 non-
compliance	in	the	Accord.	This	is	a	difficult	area	generally	in	
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